Corporate Governance Essay Example for Free

Corporate Governance Essay ABSTRACT This paper examines whether the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer position in Hong Kong public firms is affected by board composition, given the influence of family control on the boards of many Hong Kong companies. It is hypothesized that I) in family-controlled boards, Chief Executive Officers receiver higher compensation and II) Chief Executive Officers in family-controlled boards serve as Chief Executive Officer positions longer. In family-controlled boards, corporate governance is of very high importance as the independent non-executive directors can exert less influence over the board, compared to non-family-controlled boards (â€Å"dispersed boards†). Keywords: Board composition, Remuneration, Corporate Governance. 1.INTRODUCTION The economic turmoil in Asia in 1997 has led to a wider recognition of the importance of corporate governance. In line with global trends towards higher standards of corporate governance, the duties and liabilities of the directors of the listed companies have therefore become more stringent. It follows that many corporate governance mechanisms designed to monitor board members may be less effective for family-owned and family-controlled firms. However, to attract outside investors, family-owned and family-controlled firms tend to encourage greater independence and monitoring from the board. For the purposes of the study, family-owned and family-controlled are used interchangeably. The reason is that actual family ownership is difficult to ascertain due to various shareholdings and special purpose vehicles that are used, and cannot be deduced from annual reports. Thus, in this study we classify family-control and family-ownership when the board is made of a majority of related family members as a â€Å"family-controlled board†. When it is not, we classify it as a â€Å"dispersed board†. In practice, there are instances where the family owns the majority of a company but comprise of a minority of the board, and it is possible that the family is able to exert influence via other avenues, however, this study will not be examining such. Family-owned firms are common throughout Asia. Studies show that, family-owned firms hold more than 20 percent of the equity of listed companies in Asia, and more than 60 percent of the listed companies have connections with family-owned groups (Bebchuk Fried, 2006). Family-owned businesses represent the predominant form of listed companies in Hong Kong (Standard Poor’s, 2002). Such family ownership structure implies the strong influence of dominant shareholders and provides limited voice for minority shareholders. Compared to the Anglo-American environment, where ownership blocks are less concentrated but institutional investors are more prevalent, in Hong Kong, there is less of a culture for non-executive directors or minority shareholder activists to challenge. Variations in ownership structure may lead to differences in the nature of agency conflicts, the roles of directors may vary in accordance to the ownership structure. For family-owned firms, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the primary agency conflict is between a family owner and non-family owners. Meanwhile, for widely held firms, Berle and Means (1932), and, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the primary agency conflict is between executives and shareholders. As a consequence, tying remuneration to performance of executives may prove the most efficient way to mitigate this agency conflict. To date, a vast of literatures published in recent years show the growing recognition of influences of family-owned firms and executive remuneration on corporate governance. Many studies have tended to focus on the use of remuneration contracts to align interests of executives with owners in family-owned firms. The rise in executive remuneration in recent years has been the subject of public criticism, which further intensified corporate governance scandals. Therefore, the question whether a correlation exists between remuneration and family-control in board composition at Hong Kong-listed companies. 2.OBJECTIVES In 1994, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited introduced rules that require listed firms to disclose the remuneration of directors. Before 2004, there was no requirement to disclose the names and remuneration of directors (Cheng Firth, 2005). The Disclosure of Financial Information rule under Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited’s Listing Rules was amended on 31 March 2004 to require full disclosure, on an individual and named basis, of directors’ fees and any other reimbursement or emolument payable to a director. In addition, Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standard 2 requires listed firms to disclose directors’ share-based remuneration. The Code on Corporate Governance Practices forms part of the Listing Rules and came into effect on 1 January 2005. According to the Code on Corporate Governance Practices, Hong Kong’s listed firms should be overseen by an effective board, which should assume responsibility for the leadership and control of the listed firm, and the members of which should be collectively responsible for promoting the success of the firm by directing and supervising its affairs. Directors should make decisions objectively in the best interests of the firm. In regards of remuneration policy for firms’ directors, the Code on Corporate Governance Practices requires the disclosure of information related to the firm’s directors’ remuneration policy and other remuneration-related matters. There should be a formal and transparent procedure for setting policy on executive directors’ remuneration. The Chief Executive Officer, a director in the board of company, will hence have his/her full remuneration disclosed. It is recommended that remuneration should be set at a level sufficient to attract and retain directors of the caliber required to run the company successfully, but companies should avoid paying more than is necessary. However, it is argued that many corporate governance mechanisms designed to monitor board members may be less effective for family-owned firms. However, to attract outside investors, family-owned firms tend to encourage greater independence and monitoring from the board. In Hong Kong, there are quite a number of listed companies have a high concentration of family ownership. It is common for the top executives of family-owned firms in Hong Kong to be family members. The rise of remuneration of family executives in family-owned firms has been the subject of public criticism. Recognizing this, the purpose of this research is to find out whether there is any relationship between family-board-control of firms and remuneration of Chief Executive Officers. To summarize, this study revolves around the following major objectives. †¢ To test whether there are significant differences in Chief Executive Officers’ remuneration for family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms (specifically firms with family-controlled boards and firms without family-controlled boards); †¢ To find out whether â€Å"Family Chief Executive Offices† (cases where the Chief Executive Officer are family members of the family-controlled boards) are awarded excessive compensation, compromising standards of corporate governance; †¢ To examine the tenure of Chief Executive Officers for family-controlled firms vs non-family-controlled firms, given that there may be differences in the board’s ongoing approval and demand of the results delivered by the Chief Executive Office; and †¢ To test whether there are significant differences in corporate governance structure of family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms. 3.LITERATURES REVIEW, HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 3.1 Agency theory It is commonly acknowledged that ownership structure, the basis of corporate governance, is important to the overall performance of firms. While there are a large number of literatures discussing ownership structure, agency theory is frequently cited as a foundation. In modern corporations, the separation of ownership and control leads to agency conflicts that can be alleviated through various corporate governance mechanisms (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As one such mechanism, compensation schemes are designed to provide incentives that align the behavior of agents to act on behalf of principles (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This relationship between executive compensation and firm performance has received considerable attention from the general public and academics. One of the issues in the field of management is the impact of family influence (Mishra et. al., 2001; McConaughy et. al., 1998) and corporate governance on the value of a firm (Khatri et al., 2001; Kwak, 2003; Black et al., 2003). There are various studies in diverse areas like accounting, economics, finance, law and management have been conducted to study such impact (Mishra et al., 2001; Kwak, 2003; Blacket al., 2003; Andersen and Reeb, 2003). These studies have resulted in interesting and useful observations. According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), the principal agent problem comes from hidden action due to asymmetric information. The essence of a firm is that, it permits people to work as a team. It is the cooperation of a team that leads to a firm’s output. Thus, the agency problem inevitably arises in corporate governance. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agent problem arises from the conflict of interests between shareholders as the principals and the executives as the agents. Consequently, residual control rights fall into the hands of management instead of the residual cash flow claimants. As a result, the sum of monitoring expenditures be incurred by the principal, bonding expenditures incurred by the agent, and the value of the lost residual borne by the principal are included as the cost of agency. In general, when ownership of a firm becomes more dispersed, the agency problem will be deteriorated due to the inability of the relatively small shareholders to monitor the behavior of management. The monitoring of managers by shareholders is also weakened by free-rider problem. To mitigate the problem of agency, Ang (2000) and Denis and Sarin (1999) suggested the shareholding of management to be increased in order to make the executive a significant claimant. An inverse correlation exists between the dispersed ownership and firm performance (Berle and Means, 1932), because executives’ interests do not coincide with the interest of shareholders so that corporate resources are not used for the maximization of shareholders’ wealth. This view has been supported by many scholars. Shleifer and Vishny (1986), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Zingales (1995) found a strong positive relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance. In transitional economies, Xu and Wang (1999) and Chen (2001) found a positive relationship between actual firm performance and ownership concentration for a sample of listed Chinese companies. 3.2Ownership Structure It is common in Hong Kong, that ownership structure is characterized by single dominant owners (Chau Leung, 2006). A report of the Corporate Governance Working Group of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants in 1995 indicated that a high concentration on family-controlled listed firms is highly entrepreneurial and opportunistic in their business strategies, however, the report also indicate that these firms with single dominant owners lack resources and corporate culture to maintain strong internal corporate control. The 2001 Review on Corporate Governance by the Hong Kong Standing Committee for Corporate Law Reform, as well as a report from Standard Poor’s, indicated that family ownership structures present particular challenges. Theoretically, there is a major puzzle regarding the role of family in large firms (Bertrand Schoar, 2006; Villalonga Amit, 2006). In family-controlled firms, threatening factors may negatively influence the firms’ value (Demstez, 1983; Demstez and Lehn, 1985). Table 1 as below lists positive and negative factors affecting the relationship between family control and firm value. It shows that there is still difference of opinion among researchers on this topic of importance. 3.3â€Å"Family† Chief Executive Officers In this study, whether a person belonging to the family acts as a Chief Executive Officer is taken into account. We classify family-control and family-ownership when the board is made of a majority of related family members (â€Å"family-controlled board†). When it is not, we classify it as a â€Å"dispersed board†. Family Chief Executive Officers have substantial stockholdings of 5 percent or more (Daily Dollinger, 1993), with such given bargaining power, can be expected to influence the size and structure of their remuneration packages to their own benefit. Thus, for the purposes of this study, Chief Executive Officers with stockholdings of less than 5 percent are not counted as â€Å"Family Chief Executive Officers†. There are differing opinions on whether such Family Chief Executive Officers have higher or lower remunerations at such family-controlled firms. Some believe that such Family Chief Executive Officers are receiving above-average compensation due to the family-controlled board, as well as their strong ability to influence remuneration committee. Oh the other hand, others take the opposite view and see that Family Chief Executive Officers should be receiving below-average compensation. There is several reasons for this expectation. First of all, both anecdotal (Applegate, 1994; Kets de Vries, 1993) and empirical (Allen Pamian, 1982; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2001) evidence suggest that incumbents with family ties to owners enjoy high employment security. As argued by Beehr (1997), the Family Chief Executive Officer inherently plays two overlapping and interdependent roles: a work role as steward of the company, and a non-work role as fulfillment of family obligations. In reciprocity for this role duality, the Family Chief Executive Officer is rewarded with a relatively assured job (Allen Pamian, 1982; Kets de Vries, 1993; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Moreover, some literatures suggested that evaluators are more likely to make positive performance attributions to employees when there are emotional ties between monitoring and those being judged (Cardy Dobbins, 1993). It is expected that in family-controlled firms, board members in their role as monitors may be less inclined to attribute disappointing results to the Family Chief Executive Officer, giving the benefit of the doubt to the incumbent when interpreting ambiguous performance data. Agency theory suggests that there are inherent conflicts between shareholders and executives. Applying agency theory’s logic, the above scenario suggests that in family-controlled firms, risk adverse agents would trade higher job security for lower earnings if they are related to principals. Family Chief Executive Officers mitigate usual agency costs because of their aligned interests with the owners (Anderson Reeb, 2003). The information asymmetry problem in agency relationships may also be reduced given the close ties between Family Chief Executive Officers and the owners. Since they hold high ownership stakes, Family Chief Executive Officers have sufficient incentives to place family welfare ahead of personal interests, thus may perform better than firms with non-family Chief Executive Officers. Barney (2001) suggested that appointing family members as Chief Executive Officers may be beneficial. Tradition, loyalty, and bonding relationships determine how resources are deployed in family firms. Family Chief Executive Officers build common interests and identities (Habbershon Williams, 1999) and play a dual role by being both owners and executives (Chang, 2003; Yiu, Bruton, Lu, 2005). Through social relationships with managers and employees, Family Chief Executive Officers may help to obtain intangible resources such as goal congruence, trust, and social interactions, providing valuable, unique, and hard-to-imitate competitive advantage (Chu, 2011; Liu et al., 2011; Luo Chung, 2005). The Code on Corporate Governance Practices recommends remuneration committee to seek advice from the Chief Executive Officer on the matter of directors’ remuneration. Executives in firms controlled by a large shareholder receive more compensation for performance, than executives in firms lacking a controlling owner (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987). Mehran (1995) examined the relationship between executive remuneration, ownership structure and firm performance. The results indicate that firms, which have more outside directors, have a higher percentage of executive remuneration in equity-based form. Moreover, the percentage of equity-based remuneration is inversely related to the outside directors’ equity ownership, i.e., the executive’s equity-based remuneration rose if the outside directors’ owned less of the company, and vice-versa. Next, Mehran (1995) turned to firm performance, and its relationship to executive remuneration and ownership structure. He used Tobin’s Q and return on assets as measures of firm performance. He found firm performance to be positively related to the percentage of executive remuneration that is equity-based. However, Mehran (1995) no relationship between firm performance and ownership structure. He concluded that the results support the notion that executive remuneration should be tied to firm performance. There is a vast amount of literature on turnover of the Chief Executive Officer position (Furtado and Karan, 1990; Kesner and Sebora, 1994; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Pitcher et al., 2000). However, according to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), the relationship between remuneration and turnover has not been subjected to rigorous empirical examination, even given the emphasis on retention as a justification for high remuneration of Chief Executive Officer. The following hypotheses are framed: Hypothesis 1: In family-controlled boards, Chief Executive Officers receive higher compensation. Hypothesis 2: Chief Executive Officers in family-controlled boards serve as Chief Executive Officer positions longer. 3.4Board Composition The role of the board is expected to represent shareholders, provide strategic guidance to and effective oversight of management, foster a culture of good governance, and promote a safe and healthy working environment within the company. In accordance to Hong Kong Stock Exchange Listing Rule 3.10, the board of directors is required to have at least three independent non-executive directors. The presence of â€Å"truly† independent non-executive directors in the corporate governance regime is seen as one way of mitigating agency problem associated with concentrated family ownership. In family-owned firms, given the influence of family control on the remuneration and performance relationships exists, where the majority of shares are in the hands of family members, under this circumstance, the executive and risk-bearer functions are merged and more of the wealth consequences of the executives’ decisions are internalized. In other words, there is less separation of ownership and control and thus lowering agency costs, which in turn leads to less cost for monitoring by outside directors. Therefore, firms closely controlled and managed by family members are expected to use lower proportion of outside directors compared with firms with disperse ownership. In widely held firms, with ownership dispersed among many investors, investors are often small and poorly informed to exercise even the control rights they actually have. Moreover, the free-rider problem faced by individual investors makes them uninterested in expending effort to learn about the firms they have financed, or even to participate in the governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As a result, the larger degree of separation of ownership and control in widely held firms leads to greater conflicts. The use of outside directors by widely held firms is expected to be more. 3.5Remuneration Committee In 1999, remuneration committees were uncommon in Hong Kong, with only few firms reporting their existence (Cheng Firth, 2005). Since 2006, Hong Kong Stock Exchange proposes a rule to require issuers to set up a remuneration committee, with the committee chairman and a majority of the members being Independent Non-executive Directors. In family-owned firms, the positions of the Chief Executive Officer are usually held by family members, who can influence the level of remuneration paid to directors. The Code on Corporate Governance Practices recommends remuneration committee to seek advice from the Chief Executive Officer on the matter of directors’ remuneration. The Code on Corporate Governance Practices recommends that the majority of remuneration committee members be Independent Non-executive Directors. The presence of Independent Non-executive Directors on the remuneration committee is supposed to be used as monitoring mechanism that prevents excessive remuneration for executive directors (Basu et al., 2007), including that of the Chief Executive Officer. The role of independent non-executive directors and large institutional shareholders becomes crucial to curtailing the possible self-serving behavior of top managers (HKSA, 2001). Studies of firms in other countries show conflicting results on the relationship between remuneration and remuneration committee. Some findings show that remuneration committees tend to reduce remuneration, whereas others report the opposite (Conyon Peck, 1998; Ezzamel Watson, 1998). However, in practice it is highly likely that the Chief Executive Officer has some influence over the compensation decision (Murphy, 1999). An important question relating to the composition of remuneration committee concerns the ideal combination of outsiders and insiders. Insiders may face distorted incentives due to their lack of independence from the Family Chief Executive Officer (Bushman et al., 2004). 3.6 Components of Remuneration The basic components of remuneration of Chief Executive Officer are similar, however, the relative level and weights on the components differ (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999, and Bryan et al., 2006). Generally, remuneration of Chief Executive Officer can be divided into four basic parts: a base salary, an annual bonus which is tied to some accounting measure of company performance, stock options, and long-term incentive plans, such as restricted stock plans and multi-year accounting-based performance plans. †¢ Base salary: is the fixed part of remuneration of Chief Executive Officer, causing risk-averse executives to prefer an increase in base salary rather than an increase in bonuses. Most components of remuneration are specified relative to base salary. †¢ Bonus: in addition to the base salary, most companies offer their executives an annual bonus plan based on a single year’s performance. The purpose of such bonuses, as well as options, is to align the incentives of the Chief Executive Officer with that of the shareholders. †¢ Stock options: are contracts, which give the owner the right to buy shares at a pre-specified exercise price. Stock options reward stock price appreciation, not total shareholder return, which includes dividends. In this study, stock options are excluded, as full details of such information would not be retrievable from annual reports. †¢ Other forms of compensation: restricted stock to be received by executives, it is restricted in the sense that shares are forfeited under certain conditions, which usually have to do with the longevity of employment. Many companies also have long-term incentive plans in addition to the bonus plans, which are based on annual performance. Top executives routinely participate in supplemental executive retirement plans in addition to the company-wide retirement plans. Most executives have some sort of severance arrangement. Finally, executives often receive benefits in the form of free use of company cars, housing, etc. Based on the various conceptual and empirical evidences presented above, this study aims to understand whether the remuneration of a Family Chief Executive Officer is influenced by the board composition, i.e. whether it is family-controlled or not. This ties into the original Hypothesis 1, thus, the further hypotheses is framed as follows: Hypothesis 3: The higher the proportion of independent non-executive members on the board of directors at family-board-controlled firms, the lower the Chief Executive Officer remuneration.

The Stages of the Haulocost Essay -- Hitler, Genocide, Jewish, human ri

Just before the second Great War, 6 million Jews were killed along with 5 million non-Jews (Miss Belevski, 2008, The Holocaust, slide #2). This atrocity and genocide of Jewish population was widely known as The Holocaust. The man who led genocide was Adolph Hitler, the leader of the Nazis, a fascist party that took control during the German Depression in the 1920s. When Hitler came in power, one of his promises was to end the â€Å"Question of the Jews†. A series of steps of the Holocaust was the â€Å"Stages of Isolation† (Miss Belevski, 2008, Stages of Isolation: Holocaust, p.1). This plan which was created by Hitler made millions die in vain. ‘In 1935, the law of Nuremberg Race was decreed’ (Miss Belevski, 2008, Stages of Isolation: Holocaust, p.2); this was the first step of the â€Å"Stages of Isolation†. With this new policy, Jewish people were stripped out of their rights; they were pulled out of schools, fired from work, and no longer held th e title â€Å"persons† or a citizen of Germany. Step two was segregation. Jews were transported to â€Å"ghettos† and many died of starvation or disease. Step 3 and 4 were concentration camps and extermination, where the mass killings began. Jews were forced into concentration camps where they would work till they die. In order to take away their identity and treat them as animals, they were not allowed to have hair or wear clothes. Many inhumane practices and terrifying stories happened in these deadly camps, such as laboratory experiments, human flesh purses, and the lady who swallowed her diamonds because that was all she had. Extermination killed millions of Jews, people who did not die from the concentration camps would be gassed in gas chambers, and mobile killing units were established to eliminate J... ...soners’ (Miss Belevski, 2008, The Holocaust, slide â€Å"Cold heart Facts†). We learnt an important lesson from the Holocaust and now we must stand up and protest for what is justice and what we believe in. To ensure peace and humanity in our world we must take action and be part of the solution. Problems in our world today, such as global warming, poverty cycle in Africa and the war in Iraq all relate to us and we must use our powers and strengths to help in anyway we can. We must not think like the countries during the 30s, these problems are not far away and they do concern us indirectly and directly. We must not blame God for what have happened. God was simply testing our abilities to protect and stand up for what is justice and humanity. We must learn from our lesson and stay united to ensure mistakes such as the Holocaust and other genocides will never occur again.

Facilitate the Counselling Process Assessment Essay

I declare that this assessment is my own work, based on my own personal research/study . I also declare that this assessment, nor parts of it, has not been previously submitted for any other unit/module or course, and that I have not copied in part or whole or otherwise plagiarised the work of another student and/or persons. I have read the ACAP Student Plagiarism and Academic Misconduct Policy and understand its implications. I also declare, if this is a practical skills assessment, that a Client/Interviewee Consent Form has been read and signed by both parties, and where applicable parental consent has been obtained. 1. Name two signs you would look for to let you know Vara is ready to end counselling. Two signs I would look for to let me know that Vara is ready to end counselling are, firstly, if Vara is sounding a lot more confident and she looks a lot happier, then she probably is. Secondly, if Vara started to run out of issues to raise and discuss in counselling. I would be able to recognise that Vara is ready to end counselling. 2. Briefly describe how you would support Vara’s sense of autonomy. I would support Vara’s sense of autonomy by, acknowledging and helping her to recognise, her achievements since beginning with counselling. I would summarise these achievements for Vara. Vara has spoken to her husband Alec, and made him aware of her feelings. This is something she found quite difficult to do in the past. Since Vara communicated her feelings of ‘being fed up and wanting to end the marriage’, Vara and Alec have decided to trial a three month separation. In speaking up for herself she has generated real change in her life. Both Vara and her husband Alec, are looking into the possibility of seeing a marriage counsellor. In seeking this kind of counselling she is showing strength of character, she is looking for solutions and not just running away from her problems. She has the friendship and support of Julie and is trying to increase her work hours as a translator. I would acknowledge that it was Vara that made these changes in her life, not me. This will empower Vara with the confidence to know that she is a strong and capable women who can stand up for herself. 3. Briefly describe how you would inform her about opportunities for further support. I would inform Vara about opportunities for further support, by communicating to her that although our counselling sessions will be coming to an end, she is always able to reconnect with me, if she feels the need. Vara has indicated that she and her husband are interested in pursuing marriage counselling. I could provide Vara with some contacts for marriage counselling in her local area. Or, if she felt more comfortable, I could arrange a referral for her to a marriage counsellor that I think would be a good match for her. 4. Briefly describe three key steps to assist the process of ending the counselling process with this client. I would start this process a few sessions before the final counselling appointment. Firstly, I would encourage Vara to express any concerns she may have in regards to managing on her own without the support of the counselling relationship. I would be encouraging Vara to express her feelings about ending the counselling relationship. This will give Vara an opportunity to reflect and prepare for ending the counselling sessions. I would set the final appointment sometime in the future, so that Vara can have time to adjust to the thought of managing on her own. Secondly, I would plan with Vara to have a longer interval between our appointments, so that Vara can try out coping with her issues on her own. This will enable Vara to discuss any lingering issues that may need some attention before ending the counselling relationship. Lastly I would summarise for Vara the progress she has made, and acknowledge all the accomplishments she has made. She is now a stronger more capable women, who can stand up for herself and take care of herself. I would make sure that Vara knows that I have an open door policy, and that if she ever felt the need to reconnect with me, I would be happy to see her again. 5. Give an example of what you might say to Vara when ending counselling to ensure the underlying issues are managed. An example of what I might say to Vara when ending counselling to ensure any underlying issues are managed is, ‘Vara can you describe for me some of the strategies you have been using to help bring about the changes you have made’. This will give Vara the opportunity to reflect on how she has implemented these changes, and will reinforce the fact that it was Vara who has facilitated these changes, not me. I would also say ‘what do you think could be some coping skills you could use if these issues start to come up again’. This will give Vara the opportunity to reflect on how she has coped with these issues in the past, and to list some coping strategies that work best for her and her situation. Again this will reinforce the fact that Vara is the one who is coping with her situation, not me. I would also say ‘can you tell me again, what some of your underlying issues have been’. This will help Vara identify what the core issues are, and will make it easier for her to recognise if these issues come up again, so that she is ready to deal with them. 6. Provide an example of one of your session client notes. Client session notes. Clients Name: Vara Clients Age: 56 Date of session: 20/11/14 Session # 8 Session Duration: 60 minutes Others present: Nil Status of session: Kept Location: Office Information given by client: Vara is a 56 year old Polish immigrant. Came to Australia 25 years ago. She has raised 3 children who have all left home. Feeling very unhappy and ‘trapped’ in her marriage. Husband is ‘traditional’ male, who controls finances and has a ferocious temper. She has been secretly working and saving money. She wants to live her own life, but fearful of how she will cope on her own. She still loves her husband Alec. Summary of client’s issues: Vara has spoken to Alec and they have agreed to a 3 month trial separation, they are looking into marriage counselling. I have offered her a list of marriage counsellors in her area and offered a referral if preferred. Vara will be living with her friend Julie during her separation, and will be seeking more work hours as a translator. Notes of counsellor: I feel that Vara has made enormous progress in counselling, and believe that at this point she would benefit from marriage counselling. I have agreed to see her again if she feels the need arises.

Events Leading to the Scramble for Africa

The Scramble for Africa (1880–1900) was a period of rapid colonization of the African continent by European powers. But it wouldnt have happened except for the particular economic, social, and military evolution Europe was going through. Europeans in Africa up to the 1880s By the beginning of the 1880s, only a small part of Africa was under European rule, and that area was largely restricted to the coast and a short distance inland along major rivers such as the Niger and the Congo. Britain had Freetown in Sierra Leone, forts along the coast of The Gambia, a presence at Lagos, the Gold Coast protectorate, and a fairly major set of colonies in Southern Africa (Cape Colony, Natal, and the Transvaal which it had annexed in 1877).Southern Africa also had the independent Boer Oranje-Vrystaat (Orange Free State).France had settlements at Dakar and St Louis in Senegal and had penetrated a fair distance up the river Senegal, the Assinie, and Grand Bassam regions of Cote dIvoire, a protectorate over the coastal region of Dahomey (now Benin), and had begun colonization of Algeria as early as 1830.Portugal had long-established bases in Angola (first arriving in 1482, and subsequently retaking the port of Luanda from the Dutch in 1648) and Mozambique (first arriving in 1498 and creating trading posts by 1505).Spain had small enclaves in northwest Africa at Ceuta and Melilla (à frica Septentrional Espaà ±ola or Spanish North Africa).The Ottoman Turks controlled Egypt, Lib ya, and Tunisia (the strength of Ottoman rule varied greatly). Causes of the Scramble for Africa There were several factors that created the impetus for the Scramble for Africa, and most of these were to do with events in Europe rather than in Africa. End of the Slave Trade:  Britain had had some success in halting the slave trade around the shores of Africa, but inland the story was different. Muslim traders from north of the Sahara and on the East Coast still traded inland, and many local chiefs were reluctant to give up the use of slaves. Reports of slaving trips and markets were brought back to Europe by various explorers such as David Livingstone, and abolitionists in Britain and Europe were calling for more to be done.Exploration:  During the 19th century, barely a year went by without a European expedition into Africa. The boom in exploration was triggered to a great extent by the creation of the African Association by wealthy Englishmen in 1788, who wanted someone to find the fabled city of Timbuktu and chart the course of the Niger River. As the 19th century wore on, the goal of the European explorer changed, and rather than traveling out of pure curiosity they began to record details of markets, goods, and resources for the wealthy philanthropists who financed their trips.Henry Morton Stanley:  This naturalized American (born in Wales) was the explorer most closely connected to the start of the Scramble for Africa. Stanley had crossed the continent and located the missing Livingstone, but he is more infamously known for his explorations on behalf of King Leopold II of Belgium. Leopold hired Stanley to obtain treaties with local chieftains along the course of the River Congo with an eye on creating his own colony. Belgium was not in a financial position to fund a colony at that time. Stanleys work triggered a rush of European explorers such as the German journalist Carl Peters to do the same for various European countries.Capitalism:  The end of European trading in slaves left a need for commerce between Europe and Africa. Capitalists may have seen the light over slavery, but they still wanted to exploit the continent. New legitimate trade would be encouraged. Explorers located vast reserves of raw materials, plotted the course of trade routes, navigated rivers, and identified population centers that could serve as markets for manufactured goods from Europe. It was a time of plantations and cash crops, when the regions workforce was put to work to producing rubber, coffee, sugar, palm oil, timber, etc for Europe. And the benefits were more enticing if a colony could be set up, which gave the European nation a monopoly.Steam Engines and Iron Hulled Boats:  In 1840, the  first British ocean-going iron warship called Nemesis  arrived at Macao, south China. It changed the face of international relations between Europe and the rest of the world. The  Nemesis  had a shallow draft (five feet), a hull of iron, and two powerful steam engines. It could navigate the non-tidal sections of rivers, allowing inland access, and it was heavily armed. Livingstone used a steamer to travel up the Zambezi River in 1858 and had the parts transported overland to Lake Nyassa. Steame rs also allowed Henry Morton Stanley and Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza to explore the Congo.Quinine and Medical Advances:  Africa, especially the western regions, was known as the White Mans Grave because of the danger of two diseases: malaria and yellow fever. During the 18th century, only one in 10 Europeans sent out to the continent by the Royal African Company survived. Six of the 10 died in their first year. In 1817, French scientists Pierre-Joseph Pelletier and Joseph Bienaimà © Caventou extracted quinine from the bark of the South American cinchona tree. It proved to be the solution to malaria; Europeans could now survive the  ravages of the disease  in Africa. Unfortunately,  yellow fever  continued to be a problem, and even today there is no specific treatment for the disease.Politics:  After the creation of a unified Germany (1871) and Italy (a longer process, but its capital relocated to Rome in 1871) there was no room left in Europe for expansion. Britain, Fran ce, and Germany were in an intricate political dance, trying to maintain their dominance, and an overseas empire would secure it. France, which had lost two provinces to Germany in 1870, looked to Africa to gain more territory. Britain looked toward Egypt and the control of the Suez Canal as well as pursuing territory in gold-rich southern Africa. Germany, under the expert management of  Chancellor Bismarck, had come late to the idea of overseas colonies but was now fully convinced of their worth. All that was needed was some mechanism to be put in place to stop overt conflict over the coming land grab.Military Innovation: At the beginning of the 19th century, Europe was only marginally ahead of Africa in terms of available weapons, as traders had long supplied them to local chiefs and many had stockpiles of guns and gunpowder. But two innovations gave Europe a massive advantage. In the late 1860s, percussion caps were being incorporated into cartridges. What previously came as a separate bullet, powder, and wadding was now a single entity, easily transported and relatively weatherproof. The second innovation was the breech-loading rifle. Older model muskets, held by most Africans, were front loaders, which were slow to use (maximum of three rounds per minute) and had to be loaded while standing. Breech-loading guns, in comparison, could be fired between two to four times faster and could be loaded even in a prone position. Europeans, with an eye to colonization and conquest, restricted the sale of the new weaponry to Africa maintaining military superiority. The Mad Rush Into Africa in the Early 1880s Within just 20 years, the political face of Africa had changed, with only Liberia (a colony run by ex-African-American slaves) and Ethiopia remaining free of European control. The start of the 1880s saw a rapid increase in European nations claiming territory in Africa: In 1880, the region to the north of the river Congo became a French protectorate following a treaty between the King of the Bateke, Makoko, and the explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza.In 1881, Tunisia became a French protectorate and the Transvaal regained its independence.In 1882, Britain occupied Egypt (France pulled out of joint occupation), and Italy began colonization of Eritrea.In 1884, British and French Somaliland were created.In 1884,  German South West Africa, Cameroon, German East Africa, and Togo were created and Rà ­o de Oro claimed by Spain. Europeans Set the Rules for Dividing up the Continent The  Berlin Conference of 1884–1885  (and the resultant  General Act of the Conference at Berlin) laid down ground rules for the further partitioning of Africa. Navigation on the Niger and Congo rivers was to be free to all, and to declare a protectorate over a region the European colonizer must show effective occupancy and develop a sphere of influence. The floodgates of European colonization had opened. Sources and Further Reading Bryceson, Deborah Fahy. The Scramble in Africa: Reorienting Rural Livelihoods. World Development 30.5 (2002): 725–39.Chamberlain, Muriel Evelyn. The Scramble for Africa, 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2010.Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa. American Economic Review 106.7 (2016): 1802–48.Pakenham, Thomas. The Scramble For Africa. Little, Brown: 2015.